circumstance. They could scarcely keep up even the appearance of
garrisons in their forts and were apprehensive of an attack on
Ticonderoga as soon as the ice was strong enough to afford an easy
passage to troops over the lakes. At the close of the preceding
campaign General Gates had joined the army under Washington, and the
command of the army in the northern department, comprehending Albany,
Ticonderoga, Fort Stanwix, and their dependencies, remained in the
hands of General Schuyler. The services of that meritorious officer
were more solid than brilliant, and had not been duly valued by
Congress, which, like other popular assemblies, was slow in discerning
real and unostentatious merit. Disgusted at the injustice which he had
experienced he was restrained from leaving the army merely by the deep
interest which he took in the arduous struggle in which his country was
engaged, but after a full investigation of his conduct during the whole
of his command, Congress was at length convinced of the value of his
services and requested him to continue at the head of the army of the
northern department. That army he found too weak for the services which
it was expected to perform and ill-supplied with arms, clothes, and
provisions. He made every exertion to organize and place it on a
respectable footing for the ensuing campaign, but his means were scanty
and the new levies arrived slowly. General St. Clair, who had served
under Gates, commanded at Ticonderoga, and, including militia, had
nearly 2,000 men under him, but the works were extensive and would have
required 10,000 men to man them fully. [1]

The British ministry had resolved to prosecute the war vigorously on
the northern frontier of the United States, and appointed Burgoyne, who
had served under Carleton in the preceding campaign, to command the
royal army in that quarter. The appointment gave offense to Carleton,
then Governor of Canada, who naturally expected to be continued in the