man; and if the Christian could now try the experiment over again, and
thereby demonstrate the truth of the doctrine of the _resurrection_,
the same as the philosopher can try the experiment for himself, and
thereby demonstrate the truth of the doctrine _of electricity_, then
my doubts or surprise at the seeming partiality in the developement or
discovery of the principles of the doctrine _of revelation_ would be
entirely removed. But the very idea of a _revelation_ supposes the
manifestation of it to differ essentially from all the discoveries of
man. Therefore the remarks of our friend relative to the laws of
electricity, &c. seem to be hardly in point. The evidences of
revelation to all, excepting those to whom the revelation was first
made, are in their very nature essentially different from the
evidences of natural philosophy, chemistry, &c. For these are founded
in immutable principles which never vary, and are ever open at all
times to thorough investigation and experiment. Hence if the learned
have any doubts on the subject, those doubts may be removed by occular
demonstration; and even when they are enabled by any new discoveries
to correct some former opinions, which were either founded on mere
conjecture or imperfect reasoning, yet the first principles still
remain, and the former evidences, instead of being weakened, are
increased by every new discovery or experiment in the developement of
truth. But not so with evidences of divine revelation. Although ever
so clear at first, and so well supported by facts, concerning which
the witness had the clearest evidence, yet the evidences being of such
a nature as preclude a repetition, like those respecting a vision of
the night or any other phenomenon, are liable to suffer by passing
from one to another, and also to be impaired by every change which
they are caused to pass. And if the evidences of any fact may be
weakened at all, either by lapse of time, or by passing through
different hands; by the same causes, if continued, they may lose all