reason' to examine this proposition to see why it should be considered
more important than the discoveries made in the arts and sciences, &c.
I think these questions may be easily and correctly answered. One
relates to the blessings of _eternity_; and the others to those only
of _time_; hence if the truths manifested by a revelation had been of
no more importance to man than the truths in natural philosophy,
reason would say, God would have left them also to be discovered, if
discovered at all, like all other truths, without a special
revelation. But, you must excuse me for not being able to see the
force and conclusiveness of your reasoning, when you say that my
'allowing it any importance at all, is, in the eye of reason, an
argument in its support.' Supposing I am informed of a large estate
bequeathed to me by some benefactor. I acknowledge that it is very
important to me, if true, as I am in great need; yet I do not believe
it true. Now, is my acknowledging its importance, if true, an argument
in support of its truth? If it is so, the reason of it is out of my
sight.

"I should think that the reason of man (the only reason with which we
are acquainted) would hardly undertake to say whether a revelation is
either necessary or not necessary. The only evidence that reason can
have of its necessity is its truth; and a supposition that it is not
true equally supposes it not to be necessary. For to suppose otherwise
supposes that God has omitted something which was necessary to be
done! Try the matter as it respects a new revelation. Who will
undertake to say that a new revelation either is or is not necessary?
No one who believes in a revelation will deny the possibility of such
an event. Suppose then for the moment it is true; and something is
brought to light infinitely more glorious than any thing of which the
human mind has yet conceived; will any one say it is unimportant? Or