argument, the following is inserted.]

"Speaking however on the evidences of revelation, you have stated some
things worthy of serious consideration; which if correct, and I cannot
say but they are, give me considerable satisfaction; and are very
grateful to my feelings. 'It' (faith) say you 'does not require all
_possibility_ to be taken into the account: this would seem to go
beyond the limits of faith and enter into the regions of certainty.'

"According to this doctrine, I may yet, perhaps, be considered a
believer in divine revelation, and of course in Christianity. If 'all
possibility' is not required, then certainly some _doubts_, some
_possibility_ of failure, may be admited without destroying the
consistency of the Christian faith.

"Here as it respects the argument, you have seemingly forclosed every
thing which I shall say by way of objection; at least, you have
anticipated all my arguments on this subject. For evidences and
circumstances calculated to raise _doubts_ in the mind; and shewing
the _possibility_ of uncertainty, are all the arguments which I have
expected to produce in this case. But it may not be improper to
inquire how much uncertainty, or _possibility_ of uncertainty, may I
admit in my calculation without destroying the Christian faith? That
there are evidences in favor of divine revelation, and, which would
support it, if there were nothing to counterbalance their testimony,
is a proposition which I admit, and which I think cannot be disputed.
Hence I conceive it must be admitted that there is a _possibility_, at
least, of its being true.--But after all, if the weight of evidence in
the mind of any one should preponderate against it, I doubt whether
such an one could consistently be called a believer in divine