all to thirteen thousand men. This Major-General Sullivan made a good
beginning, but a bad ending, in an intended surprise on Staten Island.

If, by making too extensive a plan of attack, the English committed a
great error, it must also be acknowledged that the Americans were not
irreproachable in their manner of defence. Burgoyne, leading his army,
with their heads bent upon the ground, into woods from whence he could
not extricate them, dragged on, upon a single road, his numerous
cannons and rich military equipages. Certain of not being attacked
from behind, the Americans could dispute every step they took: this
kind of warfare attracted the militia, and Gates improved each day in
strength. Every tree sheltered a skilful rifleman, and the resources
offered by military tactics, and the talents even of their chiefs, had
become useless to the English. The corps left in New York could, it is
true, laugh at the corps of Putnam, but it was too feeble to succour
Burgoyne; and instead of being able to secure his triumph, its own
fate was even dependent upon his. During that time, Howe was only
thinking of Philadelphia, and it was at the expense of the northern
expedition that he was repairing thither by an enormous circuit. But,
on the other side, why were the English permitted to land so
tranquilly? Why was the moment allowed to pass when their army was
divided by the river Elk? Why in the south were so many false
movements and so much hesitation displayed? Because the Americans had
hitherto had combats but not battles; because, instead of harassing an
army and disputing hollows, they were obliged to protect an open city,
and manoeuvre in a plain, close to a hostile army, who, by attacking
them from behind, might completely ruin them. General Washington, had
he followed the advice of the people, would have enclosed his army in
a city, and thus have entrusted to one hazard the fate of America;
but, whilst refusing to commit such an act of folly, he was obliged to