character, and intended for the government of a distinct class of persons
in the community, they were bound to conform their proceedings to its
provisions, which depart in many essential features from the principles
of the common law and some of the settled rules of evidence. The court,
however, determined to adopt those rules, whenever they were not
repugnant to nor expressly excepted by that statute, nor inconsistent
with the local situation and policy of the State; and laid down for their
own government the following regulations: First, that no slave should be
tried except in the presence of his owner or his counsel, and that notice
should be given in every case at least one day before the trial; second,
that the testimony of one witness, unsupported by additional evidence or
by circumstances, should lead to no conviction of a capital nature;
third, that the witnesses should be confronted with the accused and with
each other in every case, except where testimony was given under a solemn
pledge that the names of the witnesses should not be divulged,--as they
declared, in some instances, that they apprehended being murdered by the
blacks, if it was known that they had volunteered their evidence; fourth,
that the prisoners might be represented by counsel, whenever this was
requested by the owners of the slaves, or by the prisoners themselves if
free; fifth, that the statements or defences of the accused should be
heard in every case, and they be permitted themselves to examine any
witness they thought proper."

It is singular to observe how entirely these rules seem to concede that a
slave's life has no sort of value to himself, but only to his master. His
master, not he himself, must choose whether it be worth while to employ
counsel. His master, not his mother or his wife, must be present at the
trial. So far is this carried, that the provision to exclude "persons who
had no particular interest in the slaves accused" seems to have excluded
every acknowledged relative they had in the world, and admitted only