as the fidelity of their member goes. If the man elected can take the
public money, is not the temptation too great for most men? In short,
what can be more absurd, what can be more revolting to reason, what more
shocking to common sense, than the idea of a man's being _a guardian of
the public purse_, while, at the same time, he votes, in that capacity,
part of the people's money into his own pocket? In all the other
situations of life we see the payer and the receiver a check upon each
other; but, in the case of a Member of Parliament who receives part of
the public money, there is no such check.

We are often asked, whether we would wish gentlemen of great talents to
serve the country as Secretaries of State, Chancellors of the Exchequer,
&c. &c. without any pay? To which I, for myself, answer _no_. I would
not only have them paid, but _well paid_; but I would not have them sit
in parliament while they received the pay. If we are told that this is
_impracticable_, we point to the experience in its support; for, in the
United States of America, there are no paid officers in the Legislature.
No man can be a member of either House who is in the receipt of a
six-pence of the public money under the Executive; and, what is more, he
cannot receive any of the public money, in the shape of salary, during
the time for which he has been elected, if the office from which the
salary is derived has been created or its income increased since his
election. This is the case in America. There are no chancellors of the
exchequer, no secretaries of state, or of war, or of the admiralty, in
either House of Congress; there is no _Treasury Bench_; there are no
ministers and none of those other things of the same kind, and which I
will not here name. Yet is America now exceedingly well governed; the
people are _happy_ and _free_; there are about _eight millions_ of them,
and there are _no paupers_; in that country poor men do not, to be sure,
crawl almost upon their bellies before the rich, but, there are very few