The Russian Revolution; the Jugo-Slav Movement by Frank Alfred Golder;Robert Joseph Kerner;Samuel Northrup Harper;Alexander Ivanovitch Petrunkevitch
page 52 of 80 (65%)
page 52 of 80 (65%)
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less, desired a liberal government. These men worked among the soldiers and
officers with a view to creating a feeling of distrust in the Emperor, and the Government, and its incompetence and corruption gave plenty of material for the propagandists. Loyalty to the dynasty was undermined and as soon as one prop was removed, as soon as one company of soldiers went over, the others followed and the whole edifice came tumbling down. Still another factor was the large number of new recruits that were stationed in the capital; they were as yet not well disciplined, obedience had not yet become a second nature to them. Many of them had come from the factories, some of them were personally acquainted with the men and women who were in the demonstrations and therefore would not fire on them. Had there been at the time in the city three or four old and well-disciplined regiments, or had the Cossacks who were on hand not interfered with the police, the uprising would have been crushed quickly and effectively as similar affairs had been before. Yet one other factor contributed to the success of the revolution and that was the over-confidence of the Government. The soldiers had been loyal until now and it never occurred to those in power that they might not always be so. They made no special preparations other than placing machine guns on roofs. They did not even make use of the armored cars. When they realized that the army in the city could not be trusted, they called for troops from the front but they came too late. From the point of view of the monarchy it was unfortunate that Protopopov sent the Emperor to the front after having secured from him a signed blank to dismiss the Duma; for if the Tsar had been at Tsarskoe Selo, he might have been prevailed upon to make some concessions and saved the dynasty for a time at least. |
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