steadily to call out certain acts, habits are formed which
function with the same uniformity as the original stimuli. If a
rat is put in a maze and finds food only by making a given number
of turns in a given sequence, his activity is gradually modified
till he habitually takes that course rather than another when he
is hungry.

Human actions are modified in a like fashion. A burnt child
dreads the fire; if a parent arranged conditions so that every
time a child touched a certain toy he got burned, the child would
learn to avoid that toy as automatically as he avoids touching
fire. So far, however, we are dealing with what may be called
training in distinction from educative teaching. The changes
considered are in outer action rather than in mental and
emotional dispositions of behavior. The distinction is not,
however, a sharp one. The child might conceivably generate in
time a violent antipathy, not only to that particular toy, but to
the class of toys resembling it. The aversion might even persist
after he had forgotten about the original burns; later on he
might even invent some reason to account for his seemingly
irrational antipathy. In some cases, altering the external habit
of action by changing the environment to affect the stimuli to
action will also alter the mental disposition concerned in the
action. Yet this does not always happen; a person trained to
dodge a threatening blow, dodges automatically with no
corresponding thought or emotion. We have to find, then, some
differentia of training from education.

A clew may be found in the fact that the horse does not really
share in the social use to which his action is put. Some one