instance by the thousand details of daily intercourse, and one
has a picture of the most permanent and enduring method of giving
direction to the activities of the young.

In saying this, we are only repeating what was said previously
about participating in a joint activity as the chief way of
forming disposition. We have explicitly added, however, the
recognition of the part played in the joint activity by the use
of things. The philosophy of learning has been unduly dominated
by a false psychology. It is frequently stated that a person
learns by merely having the qualities of things impressed upon
his mind through the gateway of the senses. Having received a
store of sensory impressions, association or some power of mental
synthesis is supposed to combine them into ideas--into things
with a meaning. An object, stone, orange, tree, chair, is
supposed to convey different impressions of color, shape, size,
hardness, smell, taste, etc., which aggregated together
constitute the characteristic meaning of each thing. But as
matter of fact, it is the characteristic use to which the thing
is put, because of its specific qualities, which supplies the
meaning with which it is identified. A chair is a thing which is
put to one use; a table, a thing which is employed for another
purpose; an orange is a thing which costs so much, which is grown
in warm climes, which is eaten, and when eaten has an agreeable
odor and refreshing taste, etc.

The difference between an adjustment to a physical stimulus and a
mental act is that the latter involves response to a thing in its
meaning; the former does not. A noise may make me jump without
my mind being implicated. When I hear a noise and run and get