who caught and automatically returned it; and that each so acted
without knowing where the ball came from or went to. Clearly,
such action would be without point or meaning. It might be
physically controlled, but it would not be socially directed.
But suppose that each becomes aware of what the other is doing,
and becomes interested in the other's action and thereby
interested in what he is doing himself as connected with the
action of the other. The behavior of each would then be
intelligent; and socially intelligent and guided. Take one more
example of a less imaginary kind. An infant is hungry, and cries
while food is prepared in his presence. If he does not connect
his own state with what others are doing, nor what they are doing
with his own satisfaction, he simply reacts with increasing
impatience to his own increasing discomfort. He is physically
controlled by his own organic state. But when he makes a back
and forth reference, his whole attitude changes. He takes an
interest, as we say; he takes note and watches what others are
doing. He no longer reacts just to his own hunger, but behaves
in the light of what others are doing for its prospective
satisfaction. In that way, he also no longer just gives way to
hunger without knowing it, but he notes, or recognizes, or
identifies his own state. It becomes an object for him. His
attitude toward it becomes in some degree intelligent. And in
such noting of the meaning of the actions of others and of his
own state, he is socially directed.

It will be recalled that our main proposition had two sides. One
of them has now been dealt with: namely, that physical things do
not influence mind (or form ideas and beliefs) except as they are
implicated in action for prospective consequences. The other