the first year of the war, would have doubtless cost him his crown.
The Balkan States are near enough the actual theater of war to suffer
acutely from fear, and a natural timidity worked upon by many German
agents, more successfully than Prince von Buelow, has thus far kept the
people of Rumania and Greece passive in a false neutrality. Bulgaria
is a fine example of the perfect working of the German method. The
piazza certainly had no hand in the intrigues of King Ferdinand of
Bulgaria. The representatives of his people urged him to maintain at
least neutrality, not to put the nation at war with its blood kin,
against its best interest. But the thing had all been "arranged"
between the German King of Bulgaria and the German Government through
"negotiation." Germany had been successful in buying the cooeperation
of Bulgaria as it tried to buy Italy's neutrality, at the expense of
Austria. There were other factors in the case of Bulgaria that worked
to the German advantage, but the method is clear. Not the voice of the
piazza, but the secret agreement of "responsible government," in other
words, the control of despotic, German rulers. Italy may well be proud
that she has a sovereign who faithfully interprets his responsibility of
rule in a constitutional state and executes the will of his people--who
listens also to the voice of the piazza, not merely to the arguments of
the foreign diplomat. And Italy may also be proud that the piazza spoke
at a dark hour in the Allies' cause, if not the darkest, when German
arms were prevailing in the East; if the dangers of German conquest were
not as close to Italy as with the Balkan States, they were not remote,
as German threats too plainly showed.

The Venezelos-Zaimis situation was impossible in Italy, though the
circumstances were almost parallel, with Salandra and Giolitti. The
piazza knew the deep Biblical truth, "He who is not for me is against
me," and execrated the professed _neutralista_ Giolitti. But the Greeks,