reconsider his decision about the Admiralty, and found that he would
have been willing to have done so, but that it was now too late. On
the 2nd Mr. Gladstone wrote me a very nice letter quoted above,
[Footnote: Chapter XLII., p.172.] about the circumstances relating
to the trial then coming on which made it impossible for him to
include me in the Ministry. Morley wrote: "Half my satisfaction and
confidence are extinguished by your absence. It may and will make
all the difference."'

Mr. Morley's apprehension was justified by events.

In 1880 the position of the Radical leaders, while only private members,
had been of such strength that Sir Charles had been able to secure, from
a reluctant Prime Minister, the terms agreed on between Mr. Chamberlain
and himself. He had obtained for both positions in the Government, and
procured Cabinet rank for Chamberlain. Now that the power of one of the
allies was demolished, and Mr. Chamberlain stood alone, Mr. Gladstone's
view of the changed situation was apparent. The 'slight' to Chamberlain
was followed by that course of action which resulted in his breach with
the Liberal party. Together the two men could, from a far stronger point
of vantage than in 1880, have made their terms; with Mr. Chamberlain
isolated Mr. Gladstone could impose his own. The alteration in the
course of English political history which the next few months were to
effect was made finally certain by Sir Charles Dilke's fall.

Lord Rosebery wrote on February 3rd to say that he had been appointed
Foreign Secretary, an office which in happier circumstances would, he
said to Sir Charles, 'have been yours by universal consent.' The letter
went on to state in very sympathetic words how 'constantly present to
his mind' was his own inferiority in knowledge and ability to the man