forgotten, seems to have been exemplified in the comparative oblivion into
which the philosophy of Epicurus has fallen.

It is with the ethical side of the philosophy of Marcus Aurelius that we
are concerned, and with that portion only which bears on the question of
mental equipoise.

"Begin the morning," he says, "by saying to thyself, I shall meet with the
busybody, the ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful, envious, unsocial. All these
things happen to them by reason of their ignorance of what is good and
evil."

With regard to the habit of seclusion common among the self-conscious, he
says:

"If thou didst ever see a hand cut off, or a foot, or a head, lying
anywhere apart from the rest of the body, such does a man make himself, as
far as he can, who is not content with what happens, and separates himself
from others, or does any thing unsocial. Suppose that thou hast detached
thyself from the natural unity--for thou wast made by nature a part, but
now thou hast cut thyself off--yet here there is this beautiful provision,
that it is in thy power again to unite thyself. God has allowed this to no
other part, after it has been separated and cut asunder, to come together
again. But consider the kindness by which he has distinguished man, for he
has put it in his power not to be separated at all from the universal; and
when he has been separated, he has allowed him to return and to resume his
place as a part."

On the futile foreboding which plays so large a part in the tribulation of
the worrier, he says: