and seemingly pusillanimous, deference paid to Pausanias by the Ephors
long after they possessed the most alarming proofs of his treason,
Mr. Grote observes, without attempting to account for the fact, that
Pausanias, though only Regent, was far more powerful than any Spartan
King. Why so powerful? Obviously, because he possessed uncommon force
of character; a force of character strikingly attested by every
known incident of his career; and which, when concentrated upon the
conception and execution of vast designs, (even if those designs be
criminal), must be recognized as the special attribute of genius.
Thucydides, Plutarch, Diodorus, Grote, all these writers ascribe
solely to the administrative incapacity of Pausanias that offensive
arrogance which characterized his command at Byzantium, and apparently
cost Sparta the loss of her maritime hegemony. But here is precisely
one of those problems in public policy and personal conduct which the
historian bequeathes to the imaginative writer, and which needs, for
its solution, a profound knowledge rather of human nature than of
books. For dealing with such a problem, my father, in addition to the
intuitive penetration of character and motive which is common to every
great romance writer, certainly possessed two qualifications special
to himself: the habit of dealing _practically_ with political
questions, and experience in the active management of men. His
explanation of the policy of Pausanias at Byzantium, if it be not (as
I think it is) the right one, is at least the only one yet offered. I
venture to think that, historically, it merits attention; as, from the
imaginative point of view, it is undoubtedly felicitous. By elevating
our estimate of Pausanias as a statesman, it increases our interest in
him as a man.

The Author of "Pausanias" does not merely tell us that his hero, when
in conference with the Spartan commissioners, displayed "great natural