discussed as scraps of news arrived from Lisbon. Could the English
ministry have heard the comments on their imbecility passed by the
officers of the British army, even they might have doubted the perfect
wisdom of their plan. On the 6th of October, Moore had received a despatch
stating that 30,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry were to be employed in the
north of Spain. Ten thousand of these were to be sent out direct from
England, the remainder were to be composed of regiments from the army in
Portugal. Moore had the choice of taking the troops round in ships or of
marching them direct. He decided upon the latter course, for arrangements
had been made by Sir Hew Dalrymple to enter Spain by Almeida, and,
moreover, he thought that the resources of the sea-coast of Galicia would
not be more than sufficient to supply transport and food for the 10,000
men who were to land there under the command of Sir David Baird.

The English general's difficulties were indeed overwhelming. He had
soldiers who, although but recently raised, had shown themselves good
fighters; but he was altogether without even transport sufficient for the
officers. With an ample supply of money, an experienced staff, and a
well-organized commissariat, the difficulties might have been overcome,
but Sir John Moore was practically without money. His staff had no
experience whatever, and the commissariat and transport officers were
alike ignorant of the work they were called upon to perform. He was
unacquainted with the views of the Spanish government, and uninformed as
to the numbers, composition, and situation of the Spanish armies with whom
he was to act, or with those of the enemy. He had a winter march of 300
miles before he could join Sir David Baird, who would have 200 miles to
march from Corunna to join him, and there was then a. distance of another
300 miles to be traversed before he reached the Ebro, which was designated
as the centre of his operations.