was necessary to gild his policy in the eyes of the home public was
conspicuous by its absence. As it was, no language was considered to
be too bad to apply to this "imperious proconsul" who had taken upon
himself to declare a war. If it is any consolation to him, he has at any
rate the gratitude of the South African Colonies, not so much for what
he has done, for that is being carefully nullified by the subsequent
action of the Home Government, but because, believing his policy to be
right, he had the boldness to carry it out at the risk of his official
reputation. Sir Bartle Frere took a larger view of the duties of the
governor of a great dependency than to constitute himself the flickering
shadow of the Secretary of State in Downing Street, who, knowing little
of the real interests of the colony, is himself only the reflection
of those that hold the balance of power, to whom the subject is one of
entire indifference, provided that there is nothing to pay.

The details of the Zulu war are matters of melancholy history, which
it is useless to recapitulate here. With the exception of the affair at
Rorke's Drift, there is nothing to be proud of in connection with it,
and a great deal to be ashamed of, more especially its final settlement.
There is, however, one point that I wish to submit to the consideration
of my readers, and that is, that Cetywayo was never thoroughly in
earnest about the war. If he had been in earnest, if he had been
determined to put out his full strength, he would certainly have swept
Natal from end to end after his victory at Isandhlwana. There was no
force to prevent his doing so: on the contrary, it is probable that if
he had advanced a strong army over the border, a great number of the
Natal natives would have declared in his favour through fear of his
vengeance, or at the least would have remained neutral. He had ample
time at his disposal to have executed the manoeuvre twice over before
the arrival of the reinforcements, of which the results must have been