settler, not on account of the Zulus, who would benefit by the change,
but because the result would be a state of affairs similar to that in
Natal, where there are a few white men surrounded by an ever-growing
mass of Kafirs. But there is a vast difference between Annexation proper
and the Protectorate it was our duty to establish over the natives. Such
an arrangement would have presented few difficulties, and have brought
with it many advantages. White men could have been forbidden to settle
in the country. A small hut-tax, such as the Zulus would have cheerfully
paid, would have brought in forty or fifty thousand a year, an ample
sum to defray the expenses of the Resident and sub-Residents: the
maintenance of an adequate native force to keep order: and even the
execution of necessary public works. It is impossible to overrate the
advantages that must have resulted both to the Zulus and their white
neighbours from the adoption of this obvious plan, among them being
lasting peace and security to life and property; or to understand the
folly and cruelty that dictated the present arrangement, or rather
want of arrangement. Not for many years has England missed such an
opportunity of doing good, not only at no cost, but with positive
advantage to herself. Did we owe nothing to this people whose kingdom we
had broken up, and whom we had been shooting down by thousands? They
may well ask, as they do continually, what they have done that we should
treat them as we have and are doing?

It cannot be too clearly understood, that, when the Zulus laid down
their arms they did so, hoping and believing that they would be taken
over by the English Government, which, having been fairly beaten by
it, they now looked on as their head or king, and be ruled like their
brethren in Natal. They expected to have to pay taxes and to have
white magistrates placed over them, and they or the bulk of them looked
forward to the change with pleasure. It must be remembered that when