to restore the _status in quo_ as it was before the war. There can be
no half measures about it, no more worthless paper stipulations; a Zulu
king must either be allowed to rule in his own fashion or not at all.
The war would go for nothing, and would doubtless have to be fought over
again with one of Cetywayo's successors.

Also it must be remembered that it is one thing to talk of restoring
Cetywayo, and another to carry his restoration into effect. It would not
simply be a question of turning him down on the borders of Zululand, and
letting him find his own way back to his throne, for such a proceeding
would be the signal for the outbreak of civil war. It is not to be
supposed that John Dunn, and those whose interests are identical with
Dunn's, would allow the ex-king to reseat himself on the throne without
a struggle; indeed the former has openly declared his intention of
resisting the attempt by force of arms if necessary. He is by no means
anxious to give up the 15,000 pounds a year his hut-tax brings in, and
all the contingent profits and advantages of his chieftainship. If we
wish to restore Cetywayo we must first depose Dunn; in fact, we must be
ready to support his restoration by force of arms.

As regards Cetywayo himself, I cannot share the opinion of those who
think that he would be personally dangerous. He has learnt his lesson,
and would not be anxious to try conclusions with the English again;
indeed, I believe he would prove a staunch ally. But supposing him
re-established on the throne, how long would it be before a revolution,
or the hand of the assassin, to say nothing of the ordinary chances
of nature, put an end to him, and how do we know that his successor in
power would share his views?

Cetywayo's rule, bad as it was, was perhaps preferable to the reign of