on the plea that those are questions for the courts to settle.
This has been aptly termed the method of the "_referendum_
to the courts in legislation."[Footnote: Thomas Thacher, Address
before the State Bar Association of New Jersey, 1903.] It is
unfair to them, so far as any question of the Constitution is
concerned, since as soon as the measure is enacted a presumption
arises that it is not unconstitutional. The courts will not hold
otherwise without strong grounds. It comes to them with the
benefit of a full legislative endorsement. It is unfair to the
people, both as to questions of constitutionality and of
interpretation. A statute can be so drawn as to need no
interpretation, or none the outcome of which can be a matter of
doubt to any competent lawyer. A legislature abandons its
function when it enacts what it does not understand.

The Sherman Anti-Trust Act is an instance of legislation of this
character. It forbids contracts "in restraint of trade or
commerce" between the States. When the bill was reported it was
objected in the House of Representatives that these terms were
vague and uncertain. The chairman of the committee himself
stated that just what contracts will be in restraint of such
commerce would not and could not be known until the courts had
construed and interpreted the phrase.

The real intent of those who inserted it was that it should not
embrace contracts which were reasonable and not contrary to
public policy. A similar term in the English Railway and Canals
Traffic Act had received that interpretation in the English
courts, and they supposed that our courts would follow those
precedents.[Footnote: George F. Hoar, "Autobiography," II, 364.]