legislatures, without a written constitution. During this
period, the General Assembly of Connecticut repeatedly exercised
the power of setting aside judgments of courts, and its right to
do so was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United
States.[Footnote: Calder _v._ Bull, 2 Root's Reports, 350; 3
Dallas' Reports, 386.]

The courts of the United States were called upon at an early day
to determine how far Congress could invest them with functions
that were not judicial or not to be performed in a judicial
manner. An act was passed requiring the Circuit Courts to pass
upon claims for invalid pensions, their decisions to be subject
to review by Congress. The performance of this duty was
declined, and the attempt to put a judgment of a court under the
control of the legislature made the refusal so plainly proper
that the act was repealed at the next session.[Footnote:
Hayburn's Case, 2 Dallas' Reports, 409.]

It was easier for the United States to maintain from the first
this general scheme for the division of power than for the early
States. Their people had grown up under too different a plan of
government. It had become so familiar to them that they could
hardly believe that it had been abolished. Tradition for them
interpreted their new Constitutions and overmastered them. The
State legislatures therefore continued for a time to claim some
control over the judiciary, or at least a right to criticise and
censure its doings.[Footnote: See Chap. VII.]

In many of our State Constitutions, after providing for a
distribution of powers between three separate departments,