subject-matter there must always be more latitude in the issue of
patents for trifling changes, or form, or outline, since it is only
necessary that such changes should constitute a new "design" to entitle
them to a patent of this class.

The second question relates to the elements of utility in patents for
designs.

Upon this point, it is said by my predecessor, in Jason Crane _ex parte_
Commissioners, December-May, 1869, p. 1, that the construction which has
been given to the act of 1842, by the Office, ever since its passage, is
that it relates to designs for ornament merely; something of an artistic
character as contradistinguished to those of convenience or utility.

The Board of Examiners-in-Chief, in the present case, say "The practice
of the Office has been uniform from the beginning, and has always
excluded cases like the present from the benefit of the laws relating to
designs." And, again, "The general understanding has always been that
the acts of 1842 and 1861 were intended to cover articles making
pretensions to artistic excellence exclusively."

In thus denying that a new "shape or configuration" of an article,
whereby utility or convenience is promoted, is the proper subject of
a patent under the acts referred to, the Office would seem to have
involved itself in the absurdity that if a design is useless it may be
patented; whereas, if it be useful, it is entitled to no protection.

Fortunately no such "uniform practice" has existed, and the Office is
relieved from so grievous an imputation. The practice seems to have been
taken for granted by the appellate tribunals, and, so far from being