slain in 352. Philip took Pherae and Pagasae (its port), occupied Magnesia, and,
by means of promises, obtained financial aid from the Thessalians. The
expedition sent by Athens to relieve Pagasae arrived too late; but when Philip,
after putting down the tyrants of Pherae and arranging matters in Thessaly,
advanced towards the Pass of Thermopylae, an Athenian force, sent on the advice
of Diophantus and Eubulus, appeared in time to oblige him to retire to
Macedonia. Late in the autumn of 352 we find him once more in Thrace. It was
probably now that he assisted the peoples of Byzantium and Perinthus, together
with Amadocus, a rival of Cersobleptes, against the latter; with the result that
Cersobleptes was obliged to give up his son to Philip as a hostage. Philip had
also made alliance with Cardia, which, like Byzantium, was on bad terms with
Athens. He now laid siege to Heraeon Teichos, a fortress on the Propontis, but
illness obliged him to suspend operations, and the rumour of his death prevented
the Athenians from sending against him the expedition which they had resolved
upon. (The retention of her influence in this region was essential for Athens,
if her corn-supply was to be secure.) In 351, on recovering from his illness, he
entered the territory of Olynthus, which, contrary to the agreement with him,
had made peace with Athens in the previous year, apart from himself: but he did
not at present pursue the invasion further. In October 351 Athens sent
Charidemus to the Hellespont with ten ships, but no soldiers and little money.
If these are the ships alluded to in Sec. 43 of the present Speech, the Speech must
have been delivered after that date. Otherwise any date after Philip's incursion
into the territory of Olynthus would suit the contents of the Speech, and many
writers place it earlier in the year. The question of the relations of Athens
with Philip had been brought forward; and Demosthenes, who had risen first to
speak, proposes the creation of a large permanent fleet, and of a smaller force
for immediate action, laying great stress on the necessity of sending Athenian
citizens both to command and to form a substantial proportion of the troops,
which, had so far been mostly mercenaries. The scheme was worked out in detail,
both in its military and in its financial aspects, and supported with an