Eubulus lay in his freedom from all illusion as to the position in which Athens
stood, in his ability as a financier, and in his readiness to take any measures
which would enable him to carry out his policy. He saw that the prime necessity
of the moment was to recruit the financial and material strength of the city;
that until this should be effected, she was quite incapable of carrying on war
with any other power; and that she could only recover her strength through
peace. In this policy he had the support of the well-to-do classes, who suffered
heavily in time of war from taxation and the disturbance of trade. On the other
hand, the sentiments of the masses were imperialistic and militant. We gather
that there were plenty of orators who made a practice of appealing to the
glorious traditions of the past and the claim always made by Athens to
leadership among the Greek states. To buy off the opposition which his policy
might be expected to encounter, Eubulus distributed funds freely to the people,
in the shape of 'Festival-money', adopting the methods employed before him by
demagogues, very different from himself, in order that he might override the
real sentiments of the democracy; and in spite of the large amounts thus spent
he did in fact succeed, in the course of a few years, in collecting a
considerable sum without resorting to extraordinary taxation, in greatly
increasing the navy and in enlarging the dockyards. For the success of this
policy it was absolutely necessary to avoid all entanglement in war, except
under the strongest compulsion. The appeals of the Megalopolitans and the
Rhodians, to yield to which would probably have meant war with Sparta and with
Persia, must be rejected. Even in dealing with Philip, who was making himself
master of the Athenian allies on the Thermaic coast, the fact of the weakness of
Athens must be recognized, and all idea of a great expedition against Philip
must be abandoned for the present. At the same time, some necessary measures of
precaution were not neglected. It was essential to secure the route to the
Euxine, over which the Athenian corn-trade passed, if corn was not to be sold at
famine prices. For this purpose, therefore, alliance was made with the Thracian
prince, Cersobleptes; and when Philip threatened Heraeon Teichos on the