in equal measure be vouchsafed to me by you at this present trial: and
secondly--a prayer which especially touches yourselves, your consciences,
and your reputation--that the gods may put it into your minds not to take
counsel of my adversary[n] in regard to the spirit in which you ought to
hear me (for that would surely be a cruel thing), {2} but of the laws and
of your oath; wherein besides all other precepts of justice, this also is
written--that you shall listen to both sides with a like mind. And this
means, not only that you should have formed no prejudice, and should
accord equal goodwill to each, but also that you should give leave to
every man who pleads before you to adopt that order, and make that
defence, upon which he has resolved and fixed his choice.

{3} I am in many respects at a disadvantage in the present controversy, as
compared with Aeschines; and particularly, men of Athens, in two points of
importance. The first is that I am not contending for the same stake as
he. It is not the same thing for me to lose your goodwill now, as it is
for him to fail to win his case; since for me--but I would say nothing
unpleasant [n]* at the opening of my address--I say only that Aeschines
can well afford to risk this attack upon me. The second disadvantage lies
in the natural and universal tendency of mankind to hear invective and
denunciation with pleasure, and to be offended with those who praise
themselves. {4} And of the two courses in question, that which contributes
to men's pleasure has been given to Aeschines, and that which annoys (I
may say) every one is left for me. If, to avoid giving such annoyance, I
say nothing of all that I myself have done, it will be thought that I am
unable to clear myself of the charges against me, or to show the grounds
upon which I claim to deserve distinction. If, on the other hand, I
proceed to speak of my past acts and my political life, I shall often be
compelled to speak of myself. I will endeavour, then, to do this as
modestly as possible; and for all that the necessities of the case compel