asserted most strenuously, that a prince steadily and conspicuously
pursuing the interests of his people, could not fail of parliamentary
concurrence. A prince of ability, he contended, might and should be the
directing soul and spirit of his own administration; in short, his own
minister, and not the mere head of a party: and then, and not till then,
would the royal dignity be sincerely respected.

'Johnson seemed to think, that a certain degree of crown influence over
the Houses of Parliament, (not meaning a corrupt and shameful
dependence,) was very salutary, nay, even necessary, in our mixed
government[340]. "For, (said he,) if the members were under no crown
influence, and disqualified from receiving any gratification from Court,
and resembled, as they possibly might, Pym and Haslerig, and other
stubborn and sturdy members of the long Parliament, the wheels of
government would be totally obstructed. Such men would oppose, merely to
shew their power, from envy, jealousy, and perversity of disposition;
and not gaining themselves, would hate and oppose all who did: not
loving the person of the prince, and conceiving they owed him little
gratitude, from the mere spirit of insolence and contradiction, they
would oppose and thwart him upon all occasions."

'The inseparable imperfection annexed to all human governments
consisted, he said, in not being able to create a sufficient fund of
virtue and principle to carry the laws into due and effectual execution.
Wisdom might plan, but virtue alone could execute. And where could
sufficient virtue be found? A variety of delegated, and often
discretionary, powers must be entrusted somewhere; which, if not
governed by integrity and conscience, would necessarily be abused, till
at last the constable would sell his for a shilling.