of Panormus. A strong force of Peloponnesian soldiers was encamped on
the shore, to co-operate with the fleet. Phormio anchored his ships
just outside the strait, being resolved, if it were in any way
possible, not to fight the Peloponnesians in the narrow waters. As the
Peloponnesians, on their side, were equally determined not to be lured
out into the open sea, the two fleets remained confronting each other
for a whole week, without attempting any aggressive movement. At last
the Peloponnesian leaders decided to give battle with Phormio at once,
fearing that if they delayed any longer he would be reinforced from
Athens.

It was the universal custom of Greek commanders to wind up the courage
of their men on the eve of a battle by a short and pithy address,
calculated to inspire them with confidence, by giving them a
reasonable hope of victory. Such a practice, strange as it may seem to
us, was natural among a people whose armies and fleets were recruited
from the general body of the citizens, accustomed to free speech in
their public assemblies. They were not men of war by profession,
trained in habits of blind obedience, but sensitive Greeks, who
carried into the camp the noble freedom of civic life, and were not
prepared to shed their blood without sufficient cause, and a fair
prospect of success.

Seldom was there greater need of this sort of military eloquence than
on the present occasion. On both sides there was much discouragement,
and a general reluctance to begin the fight. The Peloponnesians were
cowed by their recent defeat, and dreaded the naval skill of the
Athenians, which seemed to them almost supernatural; and Phormio's men
shrank from an encounter with such enormous odds. Accordingly the
Peloponnesian captains on one side, and Phormio on the other, did what