Commodore Decatur handled his ship with absolute faultlessness.
To sum up: a brave and skilful crew, ably commanded, was matched
against an equally brave but unskilful one, with an incompetent
leader; and this accounts for the disparity of loss being so much
greater than the disparity in force.

At the outset of this battle the position of the parties was just
the reverse of that in the case of the _Constitution_ and _Guerriere_:
the Englishman had the advantage of the wind, but he used it in a
very different manner from that in which Captain Hull had done. The
latter at once ran down to close, but manoeuvred so cautiously that
no damage could be done him till he was within pistol shot. Captain
Carden did not try to close till after fatal indecision, and then
made the attempt so heedlessly that he was cut to pieces before he
got to close quarters. Commodore Decatur, also, manoeuvred more
skilfully than Captain Dacres, although the difference was less
marked between these two. The combat was a plain cannonade; the
_States_ derived no advantage from the superior number of her men,
for they were not needed. The marines in particular had nothing
whatever to do, while they had been of the greatest service against
the _Guerriere_. The advantage was simply in metal, as 10 is to 7.
Lord Howard Douglass' criticisms on these actions seem to me only
applicable in part. He says (p. 524): "The Americans would neither
approach nor permit us to join in close battle until they had gained
some extraordinary advantage from the superior faculties of their
long guns in distant cannonade, and from the intrepid, uncircumspect,
and often very exposed approach of assailants who had long been
accustomed to contemn all manoeuvring. Our vessels were crippled
in distant cannonade from encountering rashly the serious
disadvantage of making direct attacks; the uncircumspect