conclusion was, that if the 3000 promised came not that night, to march
wholly away the next morning.

It may be here demanded, why a matter of so great moment should be so
slenderly regarded, as that the Generall should march with such an army
against such an enemy, before he knew either the fulnesse of his owne
strength, or certaine meanes how he should abide the place when he should
come to it. Wherein I pray you remember the Decrees made in the Councell at
Peniche, and confirmed by publique protestation the first day of our march,
that our nauy should meet vs in the riuer of Lisbon, in the which was the
store of all our prouisions, and so the meane of our tariance in that
place, which came not, though we continued till we had no munition left to
entertaine a very small fight. We are also to consider, that the King of
Portugall (whether carried away with imagination by the aduertisements he
receiued from the Portugals, or willing by any promise to bring such an
army into his Countrey, thereby to put his fortune once more in triall)
assured the Generall, that vpon his first landing, there would be a reuolt
of his subiects: whereof there was some hope giuen at our first entry to
Peniche, by the maner of the yeelding of that towne and fort, which made
the Generall thinke it most conuenient speedily to march to the principall
place, thereby to giue courage to the rest of the Countrey. The Friers also
and the poore people that came vnto him, promised, that within two dayes
the gentlemen and others of the Countrey would come plentifully in: within
which two dayes came many more Priests, and some very few gentlemen on
horsebacke; but not til we came to Torres Vedras: where they that noted the
course of things how they passed, might somewhat discouer the weaknesse of
that people. There they tooke two dayes more: and at the end thereof
referred him till our comming to Lisbon, with assurance, that so soone as
our army should be seene there, all the inhabitants would be for the King
and fall vpon the Spaniards.