years of age; and, thirdly, upon whether they have been duly elected. If
women are found to be eligible under the law, they would stand upon the
same plane with men, in this particular, that they must be twenty-five
years, etc."

Now, then, is a woman legally qualified to sit in the General Conference
as a lay delegate? Is she a layman in the sense of that word in the
Discipline? If she be not in, she cannot be introduced contrary to law
by a mere majority vote of the General Conference. The Doctor sometimes
writes more clearly than he speaks, and it was so in the occasion of
writing this article. Over against this we have one of (as Dr. Hamilton
would say) the "subtle insinuations" of the Episcopal Address, which
declares that no definition of "layman" settles the question of
eligibility as to any class of persons. For many are classed as
laymen for the purposes of lay representation, and have to do with it
officially as laymen, yet themselves are ineligible as delegates. Well,
in this case, we have the Episcopal Board over against the editor. Both
are right and both are wrong. The editor is right when he said of a
woman, if she be a lay member her right is clear as that of any duly
elected man. But he is wrong when he denies to her a right to a seat in
this body as a layman. The Episcopal Address is wrong when it says
that "no definition of the word 'layman' settles the question of
eligibility." But it is right when it says, "Many are classed as laymen
for purposes of lay representation, and have to do with it officially as
lay members who are not themselves eligible as delegates."

In the practical work of the Church, and in the administration of its
laws, women have been regarded as laymen from the beginning until now.
They pay quarterage. If they did not pay quarterage some of our salaries
would be very short. They contribute to our benevolent collections, and