assumption underlying the legislation of the Church has been that they
were ineligible to official positions, except by special provision of
law. In harmony with this assumption, they have been made eligible,
by special enactment, of the offices of steward, class-leader, and
Sunday-school superintendent, and naturally the question arises as
to whether the necessity for special legislation, in order to their
eligibility to those specified offices, does not indicate similar
necessity for special provision in order to their eligibility as
delegates, and if so it is further to be considered that the offices of
steward, class-leader, and Sunday-school superintendent may be created
and filled by simple enactments of the General Conference itself; but to
enter the General Conference, and form part of the law-making body
of the Church, requires special provision in the Constitution, and,
therefore, such provision as the General Conference alone cannot make."


Now, sir, this language moves forward with a grasp of logic akin to that
used by Chief Justice Marshall, or that eminent jurist, Cooley, from
whom I beg leave to quote. Cooley, in his great work on "Constitutional
Limitations," says:


"A Constitution is not made to mean one thing at one time, and another
at some subsequent time, when the circumstances may have changed as
perhaps to make a different rule in the case seem desirable. A principal
share of the benefit expected from written Constitutions would be
lost, if the rules they establish were so flexible as to bend to
circumstances, or be modified by public opinion.

"The meaning of the Constitution is fixed when it is adopted, and is not