companies admit their inability to be their own financiers by giving some
influential contractor his price, and allowing him to "do his own
engineering," in consideration of his taking such securities as they have
to offer, and which he undertakes to float by means of his superior
connections. Having the thing his own way, and being naturally anxious to
build his road for as little money as possible, he pares down everything
even below the standard of embarrassed railway-boards. If the road will
only hold together until he has sold his bonds, it is all he asks. If the
business is good, the road will perhaps be finished, or what is thought to
be finished, some day or other. If business is dull, nothing is done, and
the bridges and trestle-works remain such murder-traps as that on the
Albany Northern Road which broke down last year.

But it is not with such miserable apologies for railways that we have to
deal. It is on our really valuable roads, like the main lines in
Massachusetts and New York, that we shall show that the evils of imperfect
construction are felt, and will be felt, until a thorough reconstruction
has taken place. It was observed some time ago that the returns of the
Massachusetts railways for 1856 showed that there were 1,325 miles open,
costing on an average $46,480 per mile, or $61,611,721 in all. The receipts
per mile of road were $7,217, the expenses $4,260, leaving a net earning of
$2,957, or 40 per cent. of the whole. This was equal to 6.42 per cent. on
the whole cost of the railways.

For the same year the returns of all the railways in Great Britain showed
that there were 8,502 miles open, costing $173,040 per mile, or
$1,506,826,363 in all; and that the receipts per mile of road were $13,296,
the expenses $6,249, leaving a net earning of $7,047, or 53 per cent of the
whole. This was equal to a dividend of 3.97 per cent. on the whole
cost. These figures showed, that, however extravagantly the British