Lamoignon was skilled in coups d'etat. He had audacity, and combined with
Maupeou's energetic determination a greater degree of consideration and
probity. But he made a mistake as to the force of power, and what it was
possible to effect in his times. Maupeou had re-established parliament,
changing its members; Lamoignon wished to disorganize it. The first of
these means, if it had succeeded, would only have produced temporary
repose; the second must have produced a definitive one, since it aimed at
destroying the power, which the other only tried to displace; but
Maupeou's reform did not last, and that of Lamoignon could not be
effected. The execution of the latter was, however, tolerably well framed.
All the magistracy of France was exiled on the same day, in order that the
new judicial organization might take place. The keeper of the seals
deprived the parliament of Paris of its political attributes, to invest
with them a plenary court, ministerially composed, and reduced its
judicial competence in favour of bailiwicks, the jurisdiction of which he
extended. Public opinion was indignant; the Chatelet protested, the
provinces rose, and the plenary court could neither be formed nor act.
Disturbances broke out in Dauphine, Brittany, Provence, Flanders,
Languedoc, and Bearn; the ministry, instead of the regular opposition of
parliament, had to encounter one much more animated and factious. The
nobility, the third estate, the provincial states, and even the clergy,
took part in it. Brienne, pressed for money, had called together an
extraordinary assembly of the clergy, who immediately made an address to
the king, demanding the abolition of his plenary court, and the recall of
the states-general: they alone could thenceforth repair the disordered
state of the finances, secure the national debt, and terminate such
conflicts of authority.

The archbishop of Sens, by his contest with the parliament, had postponed
the financial, by creating a political difficulty. The moment the latter