Preference, Electoral Reform, the reversal or modification of the
Osborne Judgment, Payment of Members, Invalidity Insurance; in respect
of all of which legislative proposals might possibly be submitted to the
new Parliament. Obviously before the House of Commons can be regarded
with complete confidence as the expression of the national will, the
elector must be given a wider and more effective choice in the selection
of a representative.

It is, however, contended by many politicians that the main object of a
General Election is not the creation of a legislature which shall give
expression to the views of electors on public questions. "A General
Election," says the Report of the Royal Commission on Electoral
Systems,[4] "is in fact considered by a large portion of the electorate
as practically a referendum on the question which of two Governments
shall be returned to power." But were this interpretation of a General
Election accepted it would destroy the grounds on which it is claimed
that the decisions of the Commons in respect of legislation shall
prevail "within the limit of a single Parliament." Some means should be
available for controlling the Government in respect of its legislative
proposals, and the history of the Unionist administrations of 1895-1906,
during which the House of Lords failed to exercise any such control,
demonstrated the need of a check upon the action of a House of Commons
elected under present conditions. Mr. John M. Robertson, whose
democratic leanings are not open to the least suspicion, has commented
in this sense upon the lack of confidence in the representative
character of the House of Commons. "Let me remind you," said he, "that
the state of things in which the Progressive party can get in on a tidal
movement of political feeling with a majority of 200, causes deep
misgivings in the minds of many electors.... Those who desire an
effective limitation of the power of the House of Lords and its ultimate