Evidence was tendered before the Worcester Election Commission[5] to the
effect that there were 500 voters in the city who were amenable to the
influence of a small bribe, and that the party which secured the votes
of these electors won the election. Again, is there no alternative to an
electoral system which makes the representation of a town depend upon
the action of the least worthy of its citizens? Direct bribery has been
rendered more difficult by the Corrupt Practices Act, but bribery in a
much more subtle form--"nursing" the constituency--would appear to be on
the increase. Mr. Ellis T. Powell, who has had a considerable
electioneering experience, gives an admirable statement[6] of the
expenses attending a successful candidature. "If the candidate's means,"
says he, "permit of a favourable response to these invitations (appeals
for money), he is said to be engaged in 'nursing' the constituency in
which the gifts are distributed. A great proportion of these appeals
relate to funds which are for public, or quasi-public purposes, such as
those of hospitals; and there is no suggestion that any direct political
influence is exercised in consequence of donations or contributions made
to these institutions. But what is certain is that a section of the
electorate-diminishing, but still potent, section--is favourably
influenced by the fact that Mr. A. has given L100 to the funds of the
hospital, whereas Mr. B. has given L5, 5_s_., or nothing at all.
Candidates and their agents are perfectly well aware of this, and are
even known to delay the announcement of their contributions in order to
ascertain their respective amounts, and so to guard themselves against
giving less than others have done. Mr. A. is inclined to give L20, but
waits to see if Mr. B. gives L25, in which case he will raise his
intended L20 to L30. These tactics are adopted, not because either of
the candidates desires to be lavish or ostentatious in his gifts, and
still less from any vulgar desire for notoriety in itself. They are