must diminish in passing from them to their disciples; nor can any one
rest such confidence in their testimony, as in the immediate object of
his senses. But a weaker evidence can never destroy a stronger; and
therefore, were the doctrine of the real presence ever so clearly
revealed in scripture, it were directly contrary to the rules of just
reasoning to give our assent to it. It contradicts sense, though both
the scripture and tradition, on which it is supposed to be built, carry
not such evidence with them as sense; when they are considered merely as
external evidences, and are not brought home to every one's breast, by
the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit.

Nothing is so convenient as a decisive argument of this kind, which
must at least _silence_ the most arrogant bigotry and superstition, and
free us from their impertinent solicitations. I flatter myself, that I
have discovered an argument of a like nature, which, if just, will, with
the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of
superstitious delusion, and consequently, will be useful as long as the
world endures. For so long, I presume, will the accounts of miracles and
prodigies be found in all history, sacred and profane.

87. Though experience be our only guide in reasoning concerning matters
of fact; it must be acknowledged, that this guide is not altogether
infallible, but in some cases is apt to lead us into errors. One, who in
our climate, should expect better weather in any week of June than in
one of December, would reason justly, and conformably to experience; but
it is certain, that he may happen, in the event, to find himself
mistaken. However, we may observe, that, in such a case, he would have
no cause to complain of experience; because it commonly informs us
beforehand of the uncertainty, by that contrariety of events, which we
may learn from a diligent observation. All effects follow not with like