nature. The Deity is known to us only by his productions, and is a
single being in the universe, not comprehended under any species or
genus, from whose experienced attributes or qualities, we can, by
analogy, infer any attribute or quality in him. As the universe shews
wisdom and goodness, we infer wisdom and goodness. As it shews a
particular degree of these perfections, we infer a particular degree of
them, precisely adapted to the effect which we examine. But farther
attributes or farther degrees of the same attributes, we can never be
authorised to infer or suppose, by any rules of just reasoning. Now,
without some such licence of supposition, it is impossible for us to
argue from the cause, or infer any alteration in the effect, beyond what
has immediately fallen under our observation. Greater good produced by
this Being must still prove a greater degree of goodness: a more
impartial distribution of rewards and punishments must proceed from a
greater regard to justice and equity. Every supposed addition to the
works of nature makes an addition to the attributes of the Author of
nature; and consequently, being entirely unsupported by any reason or
argument, can never be admitted but as mere conjecture and
hypothesis[30].

[30] In general, it may, I think, be established as a maxim,
that where any cause is known only by its particular effects,
it must be impossible to infer any new effects from that cause;
since the qualities, which are requisite to produce these new
effects along with the former, must either be different, or
superior, or of more extensive operation, than those which
simply produced the effect, whence alone the cause is supposed
to be known to us. We can never, therefore, have any reason to
suppose the existence of these qualities. To say, that the new
effects proceed only from a continuation of the same energy,