nor from effort to overcome resistance, 52 n (cf. 60 n);
nor from influence of will over mind, 53;
many philosophers appeal to an invisible intelligent principle, to a
volition of the supreme being, and regard causes as only
occasions and our mental conceptions as revelations, 54-5;
thus diminishing the grandeur of God, 56;
this theory too bold and beyond verification by our faculties, and
is no explanation, 57;
vis inertiae, 57 n.

In single instances we only see sequence of loose events which are
conjoined and never connected, 58;
the idea of necessary connexion only arises from a number of similar
instances, and the only difference between such a number and
a single instance is that the former produces a habit of
expecting the usual attendant, 59, 61.
This customary transition is the impression from which we form the
idea of necessary connexion.

E. _Reasoning from effect to cause and conversely_, 105-115 (v.
_Providence_).

In arguing from effect to cause we must not infer more qualities in
the cause than are required to produce the effect, nor reason
backwards from an inferred cause to new effects, 105-8;
we can reason back from cause to new effects in the case of human
acts by analogy which rests on previous knowledge, 111-2;
when the effect is entirely singular and does not belong to any
species we cannot infer its cause at all, 115.