employed any term, though without a distinct meaning, we are apt to
imagine it has a determinate idea annexed to it. On the contrary, all
impressions, that is, all sensations, either outward or inward, are
strong and vivid: the limits between them are more exactly determined:
nor is it easy to fall into any error or mistake with regard to them.
When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is
employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need
but enquire, _from what impression is that supposed idea derived_? And
if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our
suspicion. By bringing ideas into so clear a light we may reasonably
hope to remove all dispute, which may arise, concerning their nature and
reality.[1]

[1] It is probable that no more was meant by those, who denied
innate ideas, than that all ideas were copies of our
impressions; though it must be confessed, that the terms, which
they employed, were not chosen with such caution, nor so
exactly defined, as to prevent all mistakes about their
doctrine. For what is meant by _innate_? If innate be
equivalent to natural, then all the perceptions and ideas of
the mind must be allowed to be innate or natural, in whatever
sense we take the latter word, whether in opposition to what is
uncommon, artificial, or miraculous. If by innate be meant,
contemporary to our birth, the dispute seems to be frivolous;
nor is it worth while to enquire at what time thinking begins,
whether before, at, or after our birth. Again, the word _idea_,
seems to be commonly taken in a very loose sense, by LOCKE and
others; as standing for any of our perceptions, our sensations
and passions, as well as thoughts. Now in this sense, I should
desire to know, what can be meant by asserting, that self-love,