be able to show us any foundation for this preference.

In a word, then, every effect is a distinct event from its cause. It
could not, therefore, be discovered in the cause, and the first
invention or conception of it, _a priori_, must be entirely arbitrary.
And even after it is suggested, the conjunction of it with the cause
must appear equally arbitrary; since there are always many other
effects, which, to reason, must seem fully as consistent and natural. In
vain, therefore, should we pretend to determine any single event, or
infer any cause or effect, without the assistance of observation and
experience.

26. Hence we may discover the reason why no philosopher, who is rational
and modest, has ever pretended to assign the ultimate cause of any
natural operation, or to show distinctly the action of that power, which
produces any single effect in the universe. It is confessed, that the
utmost effort of human reason is to reduce the principles, productive of
natural phenomena, to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many
particular effects into a few general causes, by means of reasonings
from analogy, experience, and observation. But as to the causes of these
general causes, we should in vain attempt their discovery; nor shall we
ever be able to satisfy ourselves, by any particular explication of
them. These ultimate springs and principles are totally shut up from
human curiosity and enquiry. Elasticity, gravity, cohesion of parts,
communication of motion by impulse; these are probably the ultimate
causes and principles which we shall ever discover in nature; and we may
esteem ourselves sufficiently happy, if, by accurate enquiry and
reasoning, we can trace up the particular phenomena to, or near to,
these general principles. The most perfect philosophy of the natural
kind only staves off our ignorance a little longer: as perhaps the most