connected with the political relations of France and Italy it is as yet
impossible to say. It was, and still is, very commonly believed that in
his youth Louis Napoleon had been affiliated to one or other of the secret
societies of Italy, that he was still pledged to this, was bound to obey
its orders, and that Orsini was an agent to remind him that the attainment
of high rank, far from releasing him from the bond, rendered it more
stringent, as giving him greater power and facility for carrying out the
orders he received. The independence of Italy was aimed at; and it had
been intimated to the Emperor that Orsini's was only the first of similar
messages which, if action was not taken, would be followed by a second,
with greater care to ensure its delivery.

All this may or may not have been mere gossip. What is certain is that,
during the latter months of 1858, secret negotiations had been going on
between the Emperor and Victor Emanuel, the King of Sardinia, or rather his
minister, Cavour; and that an agreement had been come to that Austria was
to be attacked and driven out of Italy. Accordingly, on January 1st, 1859,
at his New Year's reception of the foreign ministers, Louis Napoleon took
the opportunity of addressing some remarks to the Austrian Ambassador
which, to France and to all Europe, appeared threatening.

Similarly, at Turin, it was allowed to appear that war was intended; and on
both sides preparations were hurried on. In France, as in Austria, these
were on a very extensive scale. A large fleet of transports was collected
at Marseilles; troops were massed on the frontier of Savoy; and, on the
part of the Austrians, 200,000 men were assembled in readiness for action.
On April 23rd Francis Joseph, without--it was said--the knowledge of his
responsible ministers, sent an ultimatum to Turin, requiring an answer
within three days: at the expiration of that time the Austrians would cross
the frontier. The allies utilised the delay to complete their preparations;