believe that any rising in Lombardy will take place.

The unaccountable part of it is the Austrians delaying their attack. It
seemed clear that their plan would be to march upon Turin before the French
could get up, and yet they have suffered 40,000 men to be landed at Genoa,
and a considerable force to cross by Mont Cenis, without doing anything.
Can it be that the sudden notice to Piedmont was an act of the Emperor
without his ministers being consulted, and that they are less prepared than
was supposed? Bunsen's son, who is in the Prussian mission at Turin, wrote
ten days ago that the Government was ready to remove to Genoa, expecting
the Austrians to come before the French arrived, and knowing Turin to be
indefensible. It now seems that there must be a battle before Turin can
be taken. All the road from Paris to Marseilles has been encumbered with
troops, and all the steamers have been taken by the Government, and
more men will be sent if wanted. The usual effect of a war has
been perceived--namely, making the multitude rally round the
Government--consequently there is less outcry against the war than there
was, except amongst thinking people and those who are suffering from the
suspension of all trade. The Emperor himself will probably join the army
when they are prepared for an advantageous movement. He is playing a game
that may be desperate. This Russian alliance is denied, but substantially
it is true, and I have little doubt that some undertaking is effected to
give leave to Russia in Turkey, on condition that she does something for
Poland (one of L. N.'s hobbies) and helps some Italian arrangement for the
cousin.

The next letter is endorsed by Reeve--'An affectionate record of a long
friendship. I have inserted it in the copy of his Journals.'

_From Mr. C. C. Greville_