Theologico-Political Treatise — Part 1 by Benedictus de Spinoza
page 68 of 95 (71%)
page 68 of 95 (71%)
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because he fears the gallows, acts under the sway and compulsion of others,
and cannot be called just. (18) But a man who does the same from a knowledge of the true reason for laws and their necessity, acts from a firm purpose and of his own accord, and is therefore properly called just. (19) This, I take it, is Paul's meaning when he says, that those who live under the law cannot be justified through the law, for justice, as commonly defined, is the constant and perpetual will to render every man his due. (20) Thus Solomon says (Prov. xxi:15), "It is a joy to the just to do judgment," but the wicked fear. (21) Law, then, being a plan of living which men have for a certain object laid down for themselves or others, may, as it seems, be divided into human law and Divine law. {But both are opposite sides of the same coin} (22) By human law I mean a plan of living which serves only to render life and the state secure. (23) By Divine law I mean that which only regards the highest good, in other words, the true knowledge of God and love. (24) I call this law Divine because of the nature of the highest good, which I will here shortly explain as clearly as I can. (25) Inasmuch as the intellect is the best part of our being, it is evident that we should make every effort to perfect it as far as possible if we desire to search for what is really profitable to us. (26) For in intellectual perfection the highest good should consist. (27) Now, since all our knowledge, and the certainty which removes every doubt, depend solely on the knowledge of God;- firstly, because without God nothing can exist or be conceived; secondly, because so long as we have no clear and distinct idea of God we may remain in universal doubt - it follows that our highest good and perfection also depend solely on the knowledge of God. (28) Further, |
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