knowledge and clear understanding of nature, as we see how she depends on
her primal cause, and how she works according to eternal law. (35) Wherefore
so far as our understanding goes, those phenomena which we clearly and
distinctly understand have much better right to be called works of God, and
to be referred to the will of God than those about which we are entirely
ignorant, although they appeal powerfully to the imagination, and compel
men's admiration.

(36) It is only phenomena that we clearly and distinctly understand, which
heighten our knowledge of God, and most clearly indicate His will and
decrees. (37) Plainly, they are but triflers who, when they cannot explain a
thing, run back to the will of God; this is, truly, a ridiculous way of
expressing ignorance. (38) Again, even supposing that some conclusion could
be drawn from miracles, we could not possibly infer from them the existence
of God: for a miracle being an event under limitations is the expression of
a fixed and limited power; therefore we could not possibly infer from an
effect of this kind the existence of a cause whose power is infinite, but at
the utmost only of a cause whose power is greater than that of the said
effect. (39) I say at the utmost, for a phenomenon may be the result of many
concurrent causes, and its power may be less than the power of the sum of
such causes, but far greater than that of any one of them taken
individually. (40) On the other hand, the laws of nature, as we have
shown, extend over infinity, and are conceived by us as, after a fashion,
eternal, and nature works in accordance with them in a fixed and immutable
order; therefore, such laws indicate to us in a certain degree the infinity,
the eternity, and the immutability of God.

(40) We may conclude, then, that we cannot gain knowledge of the existence
and providence of God by means of miracles, but that we can far better infer
them from the fixed and immutable order of nature. (41) By miracle, I here