reason, or reason religion, or that both should not be able to keep their
sovereignity in perfect harmony. (24) I will revert to this question
presently, for I wish now to discuss Alpakhar's rule.

(26) He requires, as we have stated, that we should accept as true, or
reject as false, everything asserted or denied by Scripture, and he further
states that Scripture never expressly asserts or denies anything which
contradicts its assertions or negations elsewhere. (27) The rashness of
such a requirement and statement can escape no one. (28) For (passing over
the fact that he does not notice that Scripture consists of different books,
written at different times, for different people, by different authors: and
also that his requirement is made on his own authority without
any corroboration from reason or Scripture) he would be bound to show that
all passages which are indirectly contradictory of the rest, can be
satisfactorily explained metaphorically through the nature of the language
and the context: further, that Scripture has come down to us untampered
with. (29) However, we will go into the matter at length.

(30) Firstly, I ask what shall we do if reason prove recalcitrant? (31)
Shall we still be bound to affirm whatever Scripture affirms, and to deny
whatever Scripture denies? (32) Perhaps it will be answered that Scripture
contains nothing repugnant to reason. (33) But I insist !hat it expressly
affirms and teaches that God is jealous (namely, in the decalogue itself,
and in Exod. xxxiv:14, and in Deut. iv:24, and in many other places), and I
assert that such a doctrine is repugnant to reason. (34) It must, I suppose,
in spite of all, be accepted as true. If there are any passages in
Scripture which imply that God is not jealous, they must be taken
metaphorically as meaning nothing of the kind. (35) So, also, Scripture
expressly states (Exod. xix:20, &c.) that God came down to Mount Sinai, and
it attributes to Him other movements from place to place, nowhere