not, to cooeperate with its rulers in the work of the government and the
reform of abuses. On more than one occasion such cooeperation did not seem
entirely impossible or improbable. The admirable wisdom and moderation
shown by the Tiers-Etat in the States-General of 1614, the divers efforts
of the Parliament of Paris to check extravagant expenditure, the vigorous
struggles of the provincial assemblies to preserve some relic of their
local liberties, seemed to promise that France would continue to advance
under the leadership indeed of the monarchy, yet still retaining in large
measure the bright, free, independent spirit of old Gaul, the Gaul of
Rabelais, Montaigne, and Joinville.

After the reign of Louis XIV such cooeperation of the ruler and the ruled
became impossible. The government of France had become a machine depending
upon the action of a single spring. Spontaneity in the population at large
was extinct, and whatever there was to do must be done by the central
authority. As long as the government could correct abuses it was well; if
it ceased to be equal to this task, they must go uncorrected. When at last
the reform of secular and gigantic abuses presented itself with imperious
urgency, the alternative before the monarchy was either to carry the reform
with a high hand or perish in the failure to do so. We know how signal the
failure was, and could not help being, under the circumstances; and through
having placed the monarchy between these alternatives, it is no paradox
to say that Louis XIV was one of the most direct ancestors of the "Great
Revolution."

Nothing but special conditions in the politics both of Europe and of France
can explain this singular importance and prominence of Louis XIV's reign.
And we find that both France and Europe were indeed in an exceptional
position when he ascended the throne. The Continent of Europe, from one
end to the other, was still bleeding and prostrate from the effect of the