suddenly turned into beasts, the statement would be extremely
general, so general that there would be no conception, that is,
no idea or connection of subject and predicate, in our mind.
(3) If there were such a conception we should at the same time
be aware of the means and the causes whereby the event took place.
(4) Moreover, we pay no attention to the nature of the subject
and the predicate.

[63] (1) Now, if the first idea be not fictitious, and if all the
other ideas be deduced therefrom, our hurry to form fictitious ideas
will gradually subside. (2) Further, as a fictitious idea cannot be
clear and distinct, but is necessarily confused, and as all confusion
arises from the fact that the mind has only partial knowledge of a
thing either simple or complex, and does not distinguish between the
known and the unknown, and, again, that it directs its attention
promiscuously to all parts of an object at once without making
distinctions, it follows, first, that if the idea be of something
very simple, it must necessarily be clear and distinct. (3) For
a very simple object cannot be known in part, it must either be
known altogether or not at all.

[64] (1) Secondly, it follows that if a complex object be divided by
thought into a number of simple component parts, and if each be
regarded separately, all confusion will disappear. (2) Thirdly, it
follows that fiction cannot be simple, but is made up of the blending
of several confused ideas of diverse objects or actions existent in
nature, or rather is composed of attention directed to all such ideas
at once, [64b] and unaccompanied by any mental assent.
(64:3) Now a fiction that was simple would be clear and distinct,
and therefore true, also a fiction composed only of distinct ideas