would be clear and distinct, and therefore true. (4) For instance,
when we know the nature of the circle and the square, it is
impossible for us to blend together these two figures, and to
hypothesize a square circle, any more than a square soul, or things
of that kind.

[65] (1) Let us shortly come to our conclusion, and again repeat
that we need have no fear of confusing with true ideas that which
is only a fiction. (2) As for the first sort of fiction of which
we have already spoken, when a thing is clearly conceived, we saw
that if the existence of a that thing is in itself an eternal trut
fiction can have no part in it; but if the existence of the
conceived be not an eternal truth, we have only to be careful
such existence be compared to the thing's essence, and to
consider the order of nature. (64:3) As for the second sort of
fiction, which we stated to be the result of simultaneously
directing the attention, without the assent of the intellect,
to different confused ideas representing different things and
actions existing in nature, we have seen that an absolutely
simple thing cannot be feigned, but must be understood, and that
a complex thing is in the same case if we regard separately the
simple parts whereof it is composed; we shall not even be able
to hypothesize any untrue action concerning such objects, for we
shall be obliged to consider at the same time the causes and manner
of such action.

[66] (1) These matters being thus understood, let us pass on to
consider the false idea, observing the objects with which it is
concerned, and the means of guarding ourselves from falling into
false perceptions. (2) Neither of these tasks will present much