What Germany Thinks - The War as Germans see it by Thomas F. A. Smith
page 18 of 294 (06%)
page 18 of 294 (06%)
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A young diplomat receives the thronging masses and talks empty nothings,
including a great deal about France's sympathy for Serbia. But in this dark hour sympathy is of no avail. Downcast and silent, the people go next to the representative of Albion--who declines to appear. "The confusion in the minds of the masses caused by the Government's indecision increases from minute to minute; indescribable scenes are witnessed before the General Post Office. It is alleged that thousands and thousands of telegrams have arrived from Russia, begging the members of Serbia's royal family not to give way to Austria. It may easily be possible that the Russian telegrams all emanate from one person and have been forged, in order to counteract the disposition to yield on the part of the royal family. Without doubt both the King and Crown Prince have lost all personal influence on the final decision. They are being slowly carried along by the conflagration-party which obtained the upper hand soon after four o'clock."[3] [Footnote 3: _München-Augsburger Abendzeitung_, July 28th.] This picture gives no support to Germany's accusation that Russia had stiffened Serbia into resisting Austria's unacceptable demands. It rather leads one to consider that an action which drives a weak nation to arrive at a decision on so awful an issue in so short a time, is an action discreditable to a stronger, and impossible on the part of a morally great, power. If Serbia chose wrongly in refusing to bite the dust, then the guilt is still chargeable to Austria for forcing her little neighbour to take a choice in haste. Sir Edward Grey emphasized in his speech of July 27th the shortness of the time which all the Powers had had at their disposal to formulate a plan, by which the conflict could be restricted to the East, or amicably settled. |
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