The leaders of the Germanic States had purposely willed it so. Several
unsuccessful attempts had been made to break up the Triple Entente, the
only barrier to the Germanization, _i.e._, Prussianization, of Europe,
and in the tragedy of Serajewo the Central Powers (or, at least, the
dominating factor of the two) believed they had found a lever with which
to break down the opposition by diplomacy. If that failed an immediate
appeal to the sword should follow. The diplomatic forty-eight hours'
_coup-de-main_ failed, and the programme contained no other item except
war. In a few words this means that the dastardly crime of Princip and
his fellow conspirators was exploited by Germany, acting through
Austria, to disturb the European balance of power under the guise of a
just vengeance.

Sir Edward Grey formulated and circulated his conference proposal on the
next day, July 26th. Some persons to whom I spoke at the time welcomed
the idea; they belonged principally to the lower middle classes. One
well-known Pan-Germanist (Dr. Beckmann, professor of history in Erlangen
University) said that the proposal was an admission of a diplomatic
defeat and a sign that the Entente Powers were afraid to draw the sword.
If the three Powers in question were prepared to pocket this smack in
the face, then Germany would be satisfied, because such a defeat would
mean that the Triple Entente would never be able to work together again.

It is interesting to compare with this opinion those of two leading
newspapers:

(1.) "We understand that the German Government is not absolutely hostile
to England's endeavours to bring about a mediation between the
contending Powers by those not directly interested in the conflict. But